This decision has usually arrived at the inadequate consideration of the processes that could have caused the awful result. In addition, when evaluating events, investigators identify that the behaviours shown by operational staffs were wrong since the pessimistic results are a matter of evidence. In this sense, it is suggested that investigators probing human performance in safety incidences benefit from the retrospection. Additionally, in aviation, traditional safety awareness perceives that safety is the topmost priority. Therefore, human conducts and management in aviation operations are measured to be complete safety oriented. As a matter of fact, this is not true, and a more practical approach is to think human conducts and decision-making in the operational situation as a negotiation between productions oriented behaviours and decisions. The entire production systems and aviation is no exclusion, produce a migration of behaviours: under the crucial of financial side and effectiveness, the public are enforced to function at the boundaries of the system safety space. Indeed, the question is that how efficiently the experts can handle the compromise between production and safety. Operational errors do not exist in the individual, but operational errors basically exist in latency within the job and situational features in the background and appear as the result of managing carelessly between safety and production goals, mostly prejudiced by the common attitudes across culture.